In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 177 Amsterdam, appears in the series of the International Archives of the History of Ideas, published under the direction of P. Dibon of Nijmegen and R. Popkin of the University of California at San Diego and a distinguished international editorial committee. Other volumes demonstrate the philosophical respectability of the collection: three on Descartes and Cartesianism, one on Berkeley's immaterialism, three on Pierre Bayle, the rest on philosophical (...) topics from the Renaissance to the 19th century. In this gallery, these letters by a not very good French poet---who was yet an acute and rather individualistic judge of men and books, already one of the arbiters of intellectual and artistic life in France--may seem a little out of place. Yet, to many historians of intellectual affairs, the firm establishment of dates and personal relationships is a matter of much importance, and documents such as these, largely devoted as they are to the communication of news about books and writers, the activities of rulers and ambassadors, printers and curious travelers, can be a substantial aid in determining the structure of an historical moment, the succession and interrelationship of events. One is willing to grant that much of what Chapelain wrote to Heinsius is trivial and concerns books and literary news of slight importance, that a delicate irony makes less of some of his comments than they were worth at the time. The triviality itself is a clue to the temper of Paris during the Fronde and in the late years of the regency of Mazarin. Great ideas were not being discussed in public when Pascal was writing his Pensdes; the irony is a mode of defense against involvement, and fashionable at the time. Bray's elaborate introduction is more concerned with the artistic and subjective aspect of the letters than with their contribution to intellectual history. In about a hundred pages, he discusses his author's method of writing, the genre which this kind of letter represents, the artistry it exhibits, from basic structure to stylistic ornamentation, and finally the human and even ethical implications of this collection. His notes are full and informative; identifications are well documented and cross-referencing in the notes and in the index of names make the volume a usable source of information, even though it cannot be recommended as stimulating debate or lively narrative. The topics discussed by Chapelain range over a considerable area, without becoming controversial. There is one exceptional letter in which he instructs Heinsius in adapting his integrity to the role of a diplomat; he must acquire "un peu de dissimulation" to oppose to "l'ing~nuit~ du Parnasse." There are references to civil strife, to foreign affairs, to the rivalry of Dutch and English navies, to the sympathy of the French for the Swedish Lutheran dynasty as opposed to the Catholic ttapsburgs and the ecclesiastical electors of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier. Queen Christina of Sweden plays a continually less attractive part as the letters proceed to their end; and Christiaan Huygens, the Duc de Montausier, Ismael Boulliau, Guez de Balzac, and Gilles M4nage figure more or less regularly in these pages. Of philosophers there is little mention, and of discussion of ideas for their own sake still less. The letters are, like many another collection deriving from the age before the learned and scientific journals, a source of valuable information about certain persons and certain books; they are hardly a serious contribution to the history of ideas. H~covaT BROWN Brown University Pascal. By J. H. Broome. (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1966. pp. x + 250. $6.00.) The most remarkable feature of this work is that it locates and forcefully interprets philosophical themes common to all of Pascal's widely=diversified writing. In his works on the vacuum, the computer, geometry, hydrostatics, Grace, freedom and the art of persuasion as well as the Pens~es, Broome locates five regular features of Pascal's thought: 1) the three orders (pp. 103-4, inter alia); 2) the deux infinis (p. 146); 3) a theory of knowl- 178 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY edge; 4) a dialecticalmethod; and 5) a theory of communication. The former two themes are commonly discussed by students of... (shrink)

This article presents the new German law on advance directives from 1 September 2009. The history of the parliamentary process of this law is described, the present regulations are explained, their relevance for medical practice discussed and shortcomings are identified. Finally, the new law is compared with other regulations in the international context. Previously established legal practice in Germany has now become largely confirmed by the new law: An advanced directive must be respected in any decision concerning medical treatment, regardless (...) of the stage of the illness. It can be informally revoked at any time, even with limited decision-making capacity. Nobody may be obliged to issue a directive in any way. Advance directives do not need notarisation or routine updating after certain time intervals. Provided that the patient, who is no longer mentally competent, has issued a lasting power of attorney, or provided that the patient has been appointed a healthcare proxy by the courts, this authorised surrogate must assert the patient's will. The role of the guardianship court is clarified: it only needs to be involved in cases of disagreement as to the patient's will. The new German law thus combines more legal certainty with a liberal emphasis on patient autonomy and flexible, adaptable regulations. (shrink)

Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and social phobia (SP) are major anxiety disorders identified by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition (DSM-IV). They are comorbid, overlap in symptoms, yet present with distinct features (worry in GAD and fear of embarrassment in SP). Both have also been explained in terms of conditioning-based models. However, there is little reasoning currently to believe that GAD in adulthood reflects heightened conditionability or heightened threat processing—though patients with SP may show heightened processing (...) of social threat stimuli. Moreover, the computational architectures that maintain these disorders in adulthood are different. For GAD this may reflect the development of an inefficient “worrying” strategy of emotional regulation. For SP this appears to reflect the atypical processing of self-referential information. (shrink)

Emotional intelligence can be comprehensively redefined based on the componential emotion approach. The componential emotion approach defines emotions as processes that are elicited by goal-relevant situations and that consist of an interplay between appraisals, action tendencies, bodily reactions, expressions, and feelings. Within the componential emotion approach, emotional intelligence can be redefined as the ability (a) to identify emotions based on information from one or more of the five emotion components, (b) to understand emotions in terms of the likely appraisals, action (...) tendencies, bodily reactions, expressions, and feelings that are elicited by goal-relevant situations, and (c) to know how to regulate emotions by modifying one or more of these five components. (shrink)

Compact quantum systems have underlying compact kinematical Lie algebras, in contrast to familiar noncompact quantum systems built on the Weyl-Heisenberg algebra. Pauli asked in the latter case: to what extent does knowledge of the probability distributions in coordinate and momentum space determine the state vector? The analogous question for compact quantum systems is raised, and some preliminary results are obtained.

One method for investigating the neurobiology of consciousness is to experimentally manipulate consciousness as a variable and then visualize the resultant functional brain changes with advanced imaging techniques. To begin investigation into this area, healthy volunteers underwent positron emission tomography scanning while listening to randomized word lists in both conscious and unconscious conditions. Following anaesthesia, subjects had no explicit memories. Nonetheless, subjects demonstrated implicit memory on a forced-choice test . These subsequent memory scores were correlated with regional brain metabolism measured (...) during encoding. Conscious recall and unconscious recognition memory demonstrated considerable anatomic overlap in correlating significantly with relative glucose metabolism in auditory verbal memory areas. However, only conscious recall correlated with mediodorsal thalamic nucleus activity; unconscious recognition memory did not. These findings suggest that conscious versus unconscious memory distinctions may depend on the presence or absence of correlated thalamic activity, and directly implicate the thalamus in the neurobiology of consciousness. (shrink)

A provocative collection of technical and popular essays dealing with a variety of scientific and political topics which Popper has treated in his major works. For the most part Popper develops, sharpens, and extends to new areas, themes which he has already explored. The major theme running through the essays is that knowledge grows by unjustified and unjustifiable anticipations, guesses and conjectures. These are controlled by criticisms and refutations. Theories can never be positively justified; they can only prove to be (...) resistant to rational criticism. The boldness of Popper's conjectures demands attempted refutations on the part of the reader.--R. J. B. (shrink)

The precise relationships between ideology and cultural policies is a topic of interest to any philosopher concerned with culture. In this fascinating study, the author explores the background of Nazi ideology and policies concerning architecture. Lane persuasively shows how Nazi policies were influenced and inherited from the ideological disputes that surrounded "modern" tendencies in architecture during the Weimar period, especially those disputes concerning the Bauhaus. She also traces the devious paths whereby the social significance of architecture became an issue of (...) national concern in Germany. In the course of the analysis, we not only have a detailed study of architecture and ideology during this crucial period in German history, but a paradigm for intellectual history at its best.--R. J. B. (shrink)

A fine collection of articles explaining, defending and criticizing Whitehead. Most of the articles have been published in the Journal of Philosophy, eight in the Whitehead Centennial Issue. But Kline has rounded out the collection by including several excellent articles written especially for this volume. A list of corrigenda to Process and Reality is included, as well as a previously unpublished letter from Whitehead to Hartshorne.--R. J. B.

Despite the lament of the decline and even the death of political theory, Germino contends that "the revival of political theory is one of the momentous intellectual and cultural developments of our time." The neglect of this revival is, in part, due to the myopia and false conception of political theory by modern political scientists and positivistically orientated philosophers. After criticizing the proponents of the "alleged decline" of political theory, Germino sketches a view of political theory as a tradition of (...) inquiry practiced by the great political theorists from Plato to Hegel. He both describes and criticizes the assault upon political theory by such thinkers as Tracy, Comte, and Marx. The revival of political theory in the grand manner is to be found in such representatives as Oakeshott, Arendt, Jouvenel, and Strauss. It is Eric Voegelin that is the true hero of this revival, and despite his neglect, Germino suggests that later generations may well acclaim Voegelin "as the greatest political theorist of our time." This is a book with a strong positive thesis, and Germino balances developing stages in his argument with expositions of the positions that he both attacks and defends. There is a growing sympathy among both philosophers and political scientists for the defense of the viability of political theory developed in this book, although many of those sympathetic with the thesis may feel that sharper and more penetrating criticism is needed to defend the thesis, and may not share Germino's enthusiasm for Voegelin.--R. J. B. (shrink)

In his preface, Smart tells us that there are three types of treatises on the philosophy of science: the philosopher's philosophy of science, "baby" philosophy of science, and the scientist's philosophy of science. He classifies his own attempt as "a not too technical scientist's philosophy of science." But this book is an excellent introduction to contemporary philosophy of science for anyone interested in the topic. Smart writes lucidly and has the gift of carrying the reader from the most elementary issues (...) to some of the most recent controversies and disputes. Many of the usual topics are covered including the nature of theories, laws, explanation in the different sciences, induction, and probability. But Smart also gives a heavy emphasis to problems of space and time, especially the "direction of time." He has adopted the excellent device of supplying a commentary on further reading at the end of each chapter which enables the student to pursue topics in greater depth. Smart's own views, familiar to those who know his work, are not hidden here but there is a serious attempt to report different views and to provide the reader with the information needed to explore controversies. As an introduction for the intelligent student, this now stands as one of the best books available.--R. J. B. (shrink)

A well-written introductory and historical survey of the dialogue between Christianity and philosophy, with primary emphasis on the early Fathers, Augustine and Aquinas. Although the preface suggests that the dialogue is a continuing one, many of the essays treat it as ending with Aquinas. One wishes that more account had been taken of modern criticism of the early theological development and of modern Biblical theology. The last two chapters do this and are helped by it.—R. J. W.

A lively and sympathetic critique of the ecumenical movement, emphasizing that unity is a Christian goal only as it contributes to the Church's ability to fulfill its mission. There is a good discussion of the significance of Roman Catholic and Orthodox participation in what was originally a Protestant movement. Marty's thesis is that enough unity has been attained now to get on with the mission.--R. J. W.

Descartes plays a strange role in modern philosophy. Called the "father" of modern philosophy, he is more like a Freudian father where his "sons" feel the need to overthrow him. Perhaps no other philosopher has been "refuted" more than Descartes has. Indeed, a unifying characteristic of many diverse contemporary philosophic movements has been its anti-Cartesianism. But as so often happens in the history of philosophy, we are coming to realize that Descartes himself was not a "Cartesian." This study which is (...) designed "to help the undergraduate and graduate students in understanding Descartes' philosophy" is organized around the central philosophic issues raised in the Meditations. It is not a historical or a philosophic reconstruction of Descartes. Nor is Kenny concerned to give a last ditch defense of Descartes. Kenny takes Descartes seriously, defending him against false objections and criticizing Descartes where Kenny thinks he has gone astray. In the course of his analysis, Kenny exhibits his knowledge of Descartes' corpus and the growing literature in Anglo-Saxon philosophy dealing with Descartes. At times, Kenny doesn't do full justice to some of the objections and interpretations of Descartes. And one wishes that his own interpretations were developed in greater detail. But Kenny certainly succeeds in making Descartes "come alive" and showing us how he still is relevant for contemporary philosophic inquiry.--R. J. B. (shrink)

Those who find Buber's mature works, especially I and Thou, difficult will benefit from this early book. In it one can see Buber struggling with the same problems in a way which focuses them more clearly than in later works, even if the solution is less satisfactory. The translation is lucid, and the introduction is a substantial essay which provides an excellent entrée to Buber's thought, as well as to this book.—R. J. W.

Seventy six papers collected together to honor Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the philosopher-statesman of India. The selection of papers reflects Radhakrishnan's life long task of encouraging a genuine encounter between the thought of the east and the west.—R. J. B.

Throughout his life, Dewey emphasized the importance of developmental categories. The question naturally arises, what were Dewey's philosophic beginnings? Traditionally, this has been answered by saying that Dewey started as a Hegelian. But the truth is that Dewey did not start his philosophic career as a Hegelian. This fine edition of Dewey's earliest papers and his book on Leibniz provides the reader with an excellent opportunity to study Dewey's first attempts in philosophy. We find Dewey beginning his philosophic career with (...) discussions of materialism, Spinoza, Kant, and Leibniz. We see Dewey's early interest in education, the social sciences, and especially the "new psychology." There are reflections on religion and ethics, and the concern to make philosophy relevant to the practical affairs of men. Indeed one can see here the origins of many of Dewey's later leading ideas such as the importance of the category of the organic for philosophic analysis. Although this is Volume I in the projected first phase of the collected works of Dewey, it is actually the second volume to appear in the series. The same high level of textual analysis is employed here. There is a clear statement of the textual principles used, a helpful introduction to these papers by Lewis E. Hahn, an illuminating note on the texts by Jo Ann Boydston which helps provide the setting for each paper, and the full critical apparatus demanded by textual criticism. This is clearly a definitive critical text. All scholars and students of American philosophy must be grateful for the high standards already achieved by "Dewey Project" of Southern Illinois University.--R. J. B. (shrink)

Recently there has been a growing interest in German philosophy, but most of this interest has focused on Kant and his successors. With the exception of Leibniz, most Anglo-Saxon philosophers are ignorant of what happened in German thought before Kant. Beck has written a model history of German philosophy from Albertus Magnus to Kant. He brings enormous erudition and good judgment to the task. He clarifies for us historical relations and continuities without succumbing to the temptation of writing short atomistic (...) capsule descriptions or the story of a single Volkgeist. In the chapters on Leibniz and Kant he succeeds both in helping us to see their historical role and the systematic integrity of their thought. Some may feel that the ambitiousness of this history requires slighting some important figures and currents in German philosophy. But no matter how briefly Beck discusses a thinker or a movement, he is always illuminating. There is a helpful informal bibliography. Beck's work is superb, and we might have expected that one of our more distinguished university presses would have exercised the same care in publishing this book that Beck has taken in writing it. Unfortunately the print is extremely difficult to read and this is aggravated by the inferior quality of the paper. Costs of printing books are rising all the time, but it is sad when university presses do not hold to the highest standards, especially when publishing such an important book as this one.--R. J. B. (shrink)

An anthology of essays by Aristotle, Mill, Carroll, Dewey, Russell, Veatch and Ryle, with a brief background statement on each author. Most of the essays are concerned with the relationship of logic to philosophy.--R. J. W.

This is an intelligently designed collection of essays dealing with a variety of key issues that are in the foreground of reflection on the social and behavioral sciences. The format followed is an ideal one: a key paper, a comment by a critic, and a reply. Thus, for example, Charles Taylor explains and defends teleological explanation of behavior and engages in an exchange with Robert Borger; and Noam Chomsky reviews the problems of explanation in linguistics and is challenged by Max (...) Black. The quality of this volume is quite high and the contributors are leaders in their fields of inquiry. Not only are there explorations by philosophers but also by practicing behavioral scientists. This is therefore an excellent way of gaining an overview of some of the key issues concerning explanation in the behavioral sciences. But the volume is disappointing in breaking new ground. Many of the points and counterpoints made here can be found in other places, and frequently they are explored in greater detail in other places. The collection also reflects an Anglo-Saxon bias for there is little attempt to include any confrontations with the continental concern with the nature of explanation in the social sciences. A detailed bibliography might have helped to direct the reader to further discussion of the issues involved. But despite these limitations, this is an impressive series of confrontations.--R. J. B. (shrink)

The authors have attempted a sustained exploration of the cluster of problems involved in the relationship between Christian faith and intellectual integrity. They alternate brief essays, each picking up where the other left off. The latter sections tend to become somewhat technical for a book intended for use by undergraduate students, but there is some fruitful philosophical encounter which could make this book useful in courses in the philosophy of religion.--R. J. W.

With a great deal of fanfare and coverage by the popular press, an era of dialogue between Communism and Christianity has been initiated. Symposia, books and discussions have been encouraged on Marxist-Christian dialogue throughout the Western world. Roger Garaudy, onetime Stalinist and a leading member of the French Communist party, has become the apostle for the new Communist desire for dialogue, which draws heavily on Marx's secular humanism. While serious scholars have struggled to assess and incorporate the rediscovery of the (...) early Marx in a balanced understanding of Marx's thought, Garaudy exaggerates and sentimentalizes the fashionable humanism of Marx. The result reads more like a personal testament than a judicious assessment and presentation of Marxism.—R. J. B. (shrink)

The author attempts to show that Plato continued to hold his theory of Forms in his later period by arguing that analysis of the late dialogues reveals their assumed existence. The objects of knowledge considered in the later dialogues have the basic traits attributed to the Forms in the middle and early dialogues. The Forms are not known by "intuition" or "acquaintance," but as that which is required for λόγος. The result of this approach is a kind of Kantian interpretation (...) of Plato—that the Forms are definitive of our experience of things, not of the things themselves.—R. J. W. (shrink)

Papers by Hempel, Sellars, Caspari, Grünbaum and Feyerabend are included in this new series of lectures in the philosophy of science given at the University of Pittsburgh. Hempel defends his theory of historical explanation against recent critics; Sellars' exciting paper is the best introduction to the philosophic viewpoint that he has developed during the past fifteen years; Grünbaum argues that the problem of the nature of time belongs to physics; and Feyerabend surveys the present state of philosophic problems of quantum (...) physics. All the lectures are excellent, though little new ground is broken. Carefully edited and well designed.--R. J B. (shrink)

The first of a series of volumes containing Albright's shorter writings, some never before published, and the rest revised. In this volume Albright develops his philosophy of history more explicitly than elsewhere, elaborating his distinction between proto-logical, empirico-logical and logical levels of thought. He is very critical of philosophical system-building, especially of the idealistic type, and he sharply contrasts post-Kantian developments in epistemology with what he regards to be the correct epistemology of history. In addition to these broad considerations, there (...) are more technical discussions of Near Eastern religions, review articles of philosophical historians, and an autobiographical sketch. This volume reflects the great range and quality of scholarship which have made its author one of America's most famous scholars.—R. J. W. (shrink)

The papers collected in this volume are the results of a conference held at the Center for Continuing Education of the University of Chicago. Recognizing the convergence of interests among philosophers concerned with philosophical psychology and philosophically oriented psychologists, a number of philosophers and psychologists were brought together at the conference. The idea was a good one, but like so many interdisciplinary conferences, the results are disappointing. There is a fine historical introduction by Mischel in which he sketches the various (...) ways in which philosophy and psychology have been interconnected. The general theme is that conceptual and empirical investigations have developed in response to each other. The introduction nicely sets the scene for the possibility of contemporary cooperation. In the main, however, each of the contributors presents his thoughts on what he takes to be the key issues, but rarely speaks directly to issues raised by the other contributors. Toulmin, Peters, and Melden collectively present and further develop themes that are being currently explored in the philosophy of mind. Arnold, Atkinson, Campbell, and Madison represent a variety of approaches from the perspective of psychology. Ironically, some of the psychologists display more understanding of phenomenological trends in recent psychology than of those manifest in recent analytic philosophy.--R. J. B. (shrink)

The author maintains that for each of these religions, the present tendency toward a global culture requires: 1) a return to fundamental themes, distinguishing these from cultural accretions, and 2) the exploration of the extent to which these four religions share themes, e.g., the idea of the revelation of the Divine in all of human history. Unfortunately, this book does not contribute much to this project. The separate discussions of each religion do not give enough of the content of the (...) thought of each to make clear its fundamental themes. Redundancies are frequent, and there is a tendency to substitute a list of theologians for summaries of their thought.--R. J. W. (shrink)

Whatever one thinks of Heidegger's philosophy, he is one of the most incisive philosophic commentators of our time. He is frequently at his best and is most lucid in his close examinations of other philosophers. The introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit has been overshadowed by the much more famous preface. In his paragraph-by-paragraph analysis, Heidegger reveals how much we learn from this introduction about Hegel's conception of knowledge, philosophy, and experience. At the same time that Heidegger illuminates Hegel's text, (...) he also reveals the direction of his own thought. The translation of Heidegger's essay is published together with Kenley Dove's felicitous new translation of Hegel's "Introduction."--R. J. B. (shrink)

The point of departure in this work is a defense against that view which would hold Hegel to be a glorifier of the Prussian state, a reactionary, and an enemy of freedom. Hegel, as the work illustrates, recognized that the French Revolution only annihilated what was already in itself destroyed; and he saluted it with "rapture" as the coming of a "new dawn" in the preface of the Encyclopaedia. He continued to celebrate its anniversary even while at the same time (...) and with no less intensity holding before himself an awareness of the dangers and horrors which it occasioned. In fact, Ritter submits that one might well understand the idea of freedom brandished by the Revolution to be the fundamental element of Hegel’s entire philosophy. Hegel disengages the notion of freedom from all previous connections which, over the centuries, have distorted it, and recovers the classic definition of Aristotle : "free is the man who is for himself and not for another." Political order must guarantee this possibility. The problem posited by the Revolution is: how? Hegel, the supposed "reactionary," in all his writings, both public and private, was consistently opposed, and occasionally with passion, to any political restoration. Yet one should also take notice of Hegel’s extreme and profound antipathy for the associations of students and demagogical movements, which he saw had no rapport with the real political and historical events of the time. Both the romantic liberal and the romantic conservative united in "hatred against the law." They were concerned not with freedom as such, but with political activity which pretended to be in its service, spewing platitudes which would renounce all searching knowledge and make truth an affair of the heart, the soul, or enthusiasm. Hegel alone, with perhaps the exception of Goethe, perceived the profound danger of anarchy revealed in these movements, a danger menacing to all, when one elevates pure subjectivity and sentiment to the rank of norm for political structures. The Revolution was accompanied by the dissolution of all the representations, concepts, and norms of the previous world as if they had been the fabric of dreams. In the face of this event, along with that of the constant danger of anarchy, philosophy must furnish the ideas which can determine that which can be conserved and that which can no longer survive. For both the advocates of restoration and the revolutionaries the Revolution was understood to be the end of previous history, the severing of man from his past: one wanted merely to recover it, the other to bury it. This scission, together with the real power which it has exerted on man and his conscience, is the fundamental structure of the new age. The remainder of the current study pursues the development of this scission, revealing the inner contradiction of the poles when taken alone: the scission itself to be the unity of historic existence in the form of subjectivity and objectivity; and the scission to find its objective expression in modern civil society. There is an on-going enrichment in the notion of freedom until it finds its fulfillment in the modern State, which assures freedom by providing the structures through which it can exist. Most of what should be said is said, although Ritter’s presentation occasionally harbors some confusion, a common and probably inescapable fate when one cuts in on the dialectic to forage for an isolated topic. Still, the book achieves its goal with admirable success, and is certainly a valuable tract on Hegel vis-à-vis the notion of political freedom. The main work is a translation from the German original; it is followed by an address which develops the material in the Philosophy of Right, § 34-81; and the book concludes with a rather amazing fifty-page bibliography citing the influence exercised by Hegel’s political theory throughout the nineteenth century.—R. J. G. (shrink)

"Hermeneutics" is a term that is slowly gaining familiarity in Anglo-Saxon countries. As is so frequently the case with movements in Continental philosophy, it has been the theologians who have first displayed a serious interest in hermeneutics. Both insofar as this study has far reaching ramifications for all disciplines concerned with the nature and art of interpretation, it is relevant to the concerns of the philosopher and the literary critic. Basically, Palmer's aim is to answer the question, "what is hermeneutics?" (...) and to present the reader with the origin and diversity of approaches in recent times. He does this admirably and the book will be helpful to anyone who wants to know what hermeneutics is all about. The book also includes a bibliography of many of the most important contributions relating to the study of hermeneutics. Palmer's own enthusiasm for the field is apparent. When he concludes with thirty theses on interpretation, it begins to look as if hermeneutics is so all-inclusive that it is difficult to see what differentiates it from other approaches to the nature of interpretation.--R. J. B. (shrink)

Although Marcuse has been lavishly praised and severely condemned, he has been almost totally neglected by academic philosophers. One would have thought that MacIntyre was the ideal philosopher to write an intelligent critique of Marcuse. MacIntyre's own interests in Freud, Marx, and social theory center about the issues that have preoccupied Marcuse. Despite the claim to present Marcuse's views and then to criticize them, MacIntyre has written a stinging polemic. Marcuse is charged with being mistaken in all his key positions. (...) He fails to understand Hegel, Marx, Freud. His account of the ills of contemporary technological society is misguided. His positive program is contemptuous and dangerous. He is guilty of furthering the corruption of our language. Typical of MacIntyre's prose is his final sentence, "The philosophy of the Young Hegelians, fragments of Marxism and revised chunks of Freud's metapsychology: out of these materials Marcuse has produced a theory that, like so many of its predecessors, invokes the great names of freedom and reason while betraying their substance at every important point." On the basis of MacIntyre's reading of Marcuse it is hard to imagine that he is anything more than a bungling idiot. There is plenty to criticize in Marcuse, but MacIntyre's polemic backfires. The best and most effective critique is based on understanding, but despite appearances there is little attempt here to take Marcuse seriously. This is a pity because both Marcuse's thought and MacIntyre's important criticisms tend to get lost in all this lively prose.--R. J. B. (shrink)